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RESTRICTIONS ON PUBLICATION AND CITATION
OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS: A REASSESSMENT
Robert J. Martineau*
In response to the "crisis of volume," state and federal appellate
courts have been restricting the opinions they write to those
opinions which will: (1) establish a new. rule of law or expand,
alter, or modify an existing rule; (2) involve a legal issue of continuing public interest; (3) criticize existing law; or (4) resolve a
confiict of authority. All other opinions are limited to brief statements of the reasons for the decision, go unpublished, and
generally carry a prohibition against their being cited as precedent. Recently, critics have alleged a number of faults with this
practice, including the supposed loss of judicial accountability,
the difficulties of appellate review, the problems of predicting
precedential value, the inequalities of parties' access to unpublished opinions, and the illusory nature of the claims of judicial and litigant economy. In this Article, Professor Martineau
demonstrates that these criticisms are based on false premises
and ignore the realities of legal research and the appellate
decision making process. Professor Martineau writes that limited
publication and citation rules are an essential way to respond to
increasing caseloads, so long as: (1) they are crafted and administered to ensure that the criteria for publication are maintained with several checks on judges' discretion not to publish
and (2) the prohibitions against citing unpublished opinions be
enforced strictly through good example, sanctions, and structural
mechanisms intended to make the opinions available less readily
to people other than the immediate parties.

INTRODUCTION

The phrase "crisis of volume" is a trite but nonetheless
accurate description of the principal cause of the problems
confronting the appellate justice system in the United States.
Responses to the crisis have ranged from new structures,
*
Distinguished Research Professor of Law (Emeritus), University of Cincinnati College of Law. B.S. 1956, College of the Holy Cross; J.D. 1959, University of
Chicago Law School.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of his colleagues Paul Caron
and Michael Solimine for commenting on earlier drafts, and of his research assistant Lynn Gagel.
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such as establishing intermediate appellate courts, to new
equipment, such as prov1.ding judges and law clerks with
word processors and computer terminals. The appellate
courts themselves also have made major changes in how they
function. Some of the most common and most controversial
changes concern judicial opinions. In some cases judges do
not write an opinion. If they do write one, then they make it
shorter than a full opinion and designate it as "not for
publication." An unpublished opinion usually carries a prohibition against its being cited as precedent.
Although a few commentators have criticized the restrictions on publication and citation from the beginning, in the
past decade commentators have been nearly unanimous in
calling for their repeal, arguing that they are both fundamentally flawed in concept
and unworkable in practice. 1
.
The purpose of this Article is to analyze the validity of
publication and citation restrictions in light of the criticisms
of them and the increased numbers of unpublished opinions
included in computer databases. Part I reviews the reasons
given originally for the adoption of the restrictions: the time
and expense involved in preparing, publishing, and researching
full opinions. Part II summarizes and critiques the principal
criticisms of the restrictions: the supposed loss of judicial
accountability, the difficulties of appellate review, the problems
of predicting precedential value, inequalities of access to
unpublished opinions, and the illusory claims of judicial and
litigant economy. This Article demonstrates that the criticisms are based on false premises and ignore the realities of
legal research and the appellate decision making process. It
argues that eliminating the restrictions would create
problems far worse than those attributed to their existence.
Finally, Part III identifies problems that exist with the
restrictions, examines their causes, and proposes remedies
that will enhance rather than weaken their effectiveness.
This Article concludes that although there are several weaknesses in the· administration of rules restricting citation and
publication of judicial opinions, the rules should not be
eliminated. Rather, several changes should be made to
provide for improved administration of the rules.
.

1.

debate.

See infra note 39 for a compilation of the articles participating in the
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RESTRICTIONS ON THE
PUBLICATION AND CITATION OF OPINIONS

A. Early Commentary

Although restrictions on the publication and citation of
judicial opinions did not become widespread until the last
two decades, calls for a reduction in the number of opinions
added to the body of common-law precedent are nothing new.
Faced with roughly thirty volumes of reported decisions in
1777, England's Lord Coke warned judges not to report all
decisions. 2 Similar concerns about the growing wealth of case
law appeared on this side of the Atlantic Ocean as early as
1915.3 It was not until the early 1970s, however, that judges,
scholars, and attorneys in the United States embarked on a
serious effort to reduce the growing body of reported case law
facing the bar and the bench.
Initial discussion of curtailing publication stemmed from a
concern for maintaining a manageable body of law in light of
the growing number of cases heard by appellate courts. _The
Judicial Conference of the United States first took note of the
problem in 1964, recommending that federal courts authorize

2.
2 Coke's Rep. iii-iv (1777).
3.
See Maurice A. Young, The Unofficially Reported Case as Authority, 1 OHIO
ST. L.J. 135, 136--37 (1935) (tracing the history and use in Ohio of both officially
and unofficially reported cases and noting that in 1915 attorneys complained of
unequal access to the latter). For other early literature addressing the proliferation
of published or unpublished opinions, see also James M. Flavin, Decisions and
Opinions for Publication, 12 SYRACUSE L. REV. 137 (1960) (calling for limited
publication of the memoranda decisions of New York's Appellate Division);
Opinions of Courts: Should Number Published Be Reduced?, 34 A.B.A. J. 668 (1948)
(summarizing a committee report to the Eleventh Annual Judicial Conference for
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which recommended a
reduction of the number of published opinions and enumerated guiding principles
on which to base the publication decision); Maurice Saeta, What Price Written
Opinions!, 9 CAL. ST. B.J. 222, 222 (1934) (observing the growing number of
opinions produced yearly and noting that "in an 'era of plenty' of written opinions
there is a 'want' of good opinions [as] [y]ou cannot have quality with mass production"); id. at 223 (calling for procedural reform); Glenn R. Winters, Reducing the
Volume of Published Opinions, 20 FLA. L.J. 250, 251 (1946) (commenting on the
possibility of discontinuing publication of opinions "involving no new point of law");
id. at 252-53 (addressing who would make the publication decision); id. at 253
(questioning whether opinions, as public property, can be suppressed through judicial mandate).
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"the publication of only those opinions which are of general
precedential value." 4

B. The 1973 Advisory Council for Appellate Justice Report
Little happened until 1973, when the Advisory Council for
Appellate Justice issued a report urging appellate courts to
adopt publication rules to reduce the number of published
appellate opinions. 5 In proposing limited publication, the
Advisory Council report identifies several principal concerns.
Limited publication could "help redress the balance between
what must be produced and assimilated and the resources
available for production and assimilation."6 In contrast, the
continuation of unlimited publication threatened to "crush[]
[the common law of the United States] by its own weight if
the rate of publication [was] not abated." 7
1. Benefits of Limited Publication-The report identifies
the benefits to be gained from limited publication: saving the
judge and the appellate court bench the tim"e spent preparing
a polished, published opinion; 8 saving the lawyer the time
spent researching opinions; 9 reducing the logistical burden and
expense of maintaining a law library; 10 reducing the burden on
publishing companies to supply the increasing number of
opinions at affordable rates; 11 and reducing the burden on the
entire system of creating new devices to point the bar and the
bench to the opinions constituting precedent. 12

4.
1964 REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES 11 [hereinafter 1964 REPORT] (reporting a resolution approved by
the Conference).
5.
COMMITl'EE ON USE OF APPELLATE COURT ENERGIES, ADVISORY COUNCIL
FOR APPELLATE JUSTICE, STANDARDS FOR PuBLICATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS 1
(1973) [hereinafter COMMITTEE ON APPELLATE COURT ENERGIES]. The Council had
31members,18 of whom were federal and state judges. See id. at inside front cover.
Some of the most prominent were Roger Traynor, Griffin Bell, Walter Schaefer,
Shirley Hufstedler, and Carl McGowan. Id. The Federal Judicial Center and the
National Center for State Courts jointly sponsored the Council. Id. at preface.
6.
Id. at 6.
7.
Id.
8.
Id. at 6-7.
9.
Id. at 7.
10. Id. at 8.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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2. Purposes of Judicial Opinions-After distinguishing as
two separate inquiries whether an opinion should be written
and whether an opinion should be published, 13 the report
lists three purposes for judicial opinions. First, an opinion
permits the parties and their attorneys to see that the judges
have considered their arguments and have provided a
·reasoned justification for the decision. 14 Second, the process
of writing an opinion can force judges to clarify their thinking. "[T]hinking is disciplined by the process of written expression," because "[t]he reduction of ideas to paper" allows
for the exposure and correction of error. 15 Third, certain
judicial opinions "provide the stuff of the law. "16 They
facilitate the "understanding of legal doctrine" 17 and its applicability to current conditions by providing a look at the
court's reasoning, and they teach people in society what
actions conform to the law. 18 They help not only the litigants,
but also other citizens, public officials, and lawyers, and thus
should be disseminated widely. 19
Not all opinions, however, serve this third purpose. Only
those that do clarify or expand the law, as opposed to those
that only settle disputes, deserve publication. 20 A written
opinion not designed for publication would require less
refinement, polish, and time spent by the writing judge, 21 yet
could still serve the first two purposes of an opinion.
3. Proposals-The report recommends that the courts
adopt rules under which courts would: (1) continue to write
an opinion in every case; (2) establish standards for publication and procedures to determine whether an opinion should
be published; and (3) prohibit citation of unpublished
opinions. The report proposes several criteria for the rules.
First, to ensure consistency within a judicial system, the
highest court of each jurisdiction should promulgate rules
governing publication and citation rather than let each court
design its own plan. 22 Second, "to avoid wasted effort," a

13.
Id. at 2-3.
14. Id. at 2.
15. Id.
16.
Id.
17. · Id.
18.
Id. at 2-3.
19. Id.
20.
See id. at 15-17.
21.
See id. at 5.
22.
See id. at 9.
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tentative decision regarding publication should be made at
the earliest possible point, such as at a conference on the
case either before it is assigned or at the time of assignment. 23 An early decision maximizes the time saved by the
judge, but the decision must be only tentative so that
publication would not be precluded were the opinion writing
process to demonstrate that publication would be prudent. 24
Third, an opinion should be published only if a majority of
the judges participating in the decision agrees that the
opinion meets the publication standards set forth in the
rules. 25 Further, a concurring opinion should be published
only if it accompanies a published majority opinion. 26 In
contrast, a dissenting opinion should be published only if the
dissenter or dissenters find that it meets the standards for
publication on its own merits, regardless of the status of the
majority opinion. 27 When an entire opinion does not warrant
publication, the court should publish those portions of it that
do meet the standards. 28
The report proposes that an opinion be published if it does
any one of the following: (1) "lays down a new rule oflaw, or
alters or modifies an existing rule"; 29 (2) "involves a legal
issue of continuing public interest," as opposed .to "general
public interest ... of a fleeting nature"; 30 (3) "criticizes existing law," especially when it calls for change by a higher court
or the legislature; 31 or (4) resolves a conflict of authority and
"rationaliz[es] apparent divergencies in the way an existing
rule has been applied."32
The report further recommends that unpublished opinions
not be cited as precedent by a court or in material presented
to a court. 33 Allowing the citation of unpublished opinions
would give lawyers or others having special knowledge of
those opinions an unfair advantage to use or withhold that

23.
Id. at 11.
24.
Id. at 12.
25.
Id. at 10.
26.
Id.
27.
Id. at 10-11.
28.
Id. at 13-14.
29.
Id. at 15. The Advisory Council specifically rejected using the term "case of
first impression" because that term was too narrow. Id.
30. Id. at 16 (emphasis omitted).
31.
Id.
32. Id. at 17.
33. Id. at 18.
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knowledge. 34 It also would thwart the intended goal of judicial economy because citation would require the bar and
bench to examine unpublished opinions. 35 Allowing citation
by litigants also would encourage judges to craft their unpublished opinions more carefully, thus increasing the time
judges spend preparing them. 36

C. Responses to the Advisory Council's Report
Every federal court of appeals 37 and a majority of state
appellate courts38 responded to the Advisory Council report
by adopting rules that restrict publication and citation of
unpublished opinions. Although the rules differ in procedure
and degree of specificity, they typically have several common
characteristics that follow the report's recommendations.
First, most of the adopted rules provide that a majority of the
deciding panel make a tentative publication decision as early
in the decision making process as possible. Second, in
general, if there is a dissenting opinion, both it and the
majority opinion are published. Third, most rules outline

34. Id. at 19.
35. See id.
36. Id.
37. For a detailed analysis and comparison of the federal circuit plans, see
DONNA STIENSTRA, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., UNPUBLISHED DISPOSITIONS: PROBLEMS
OF ACCESS AND USE IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS 8-9 (1985). For a summary of the
basic characteristics of these plans, see infra text accompanying note 39. The plans
vary with regard to the availability of unpublished opinions and whether they can
be cited. Id.
38. See Jane Williams, Survey of State Court Opinion Writing and Publication
Practices, 83 LAW LIBR. J. 21, 22 (1991) (surveying state plans). At least 35 states
have a rule or statute governing the publication of opinions. See id. at 22-49. Most
of them include or are accompanied by a no-citation corollary. See id.
Ohio has a limited publication rule which differs from every other state. Under
it, an opinion of an Ohio court of appeals is published only if so designated by the
majority of the panel hearing the case and by the Ohio Supreme Court's reporter of
decisions. Id. at 41. The Ohio Supreme Court reporter, "not a judge[,] but a bureaucrat," can veto the panel's decision to publish. William M. Richman & William L.
Reynolds, The Supreme Court Rules for the Reporting of Opinions: A Critique, 46
OHIO ST. L.J. 313, 327 (1985) (characterizing the rule as "bizarre"). Only a very
small percentage of opinions by the courts of appeals in Ohio are published. See id.
at 316 & n.24, 326. Unpublished opinions, however, may be cited. See id. at 333. As
a result, a legal publisher does publish the "unpublished" opinions. Id. at 332-33.
This whole system has been severely criticized, but with no effect. See, e.g., id. at
326, 327, 329.
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specific criteria on which judges should rely in making the
publication decision: principally whether the opinion makes
new law, criticizes existing law, or involves a matter of great
public interest. Finally, most rules forbid citation to unpublished opinions except for the limited purposes of es:tablishing resjudicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case. 39
39.
For discussion and evaluation of the different plans adopted by individual
states and circuits, see generally the literature cited infra Part III and the following: Harry L. Anstead, Selective Publication: An Alternative to the PCA?, 34 U. FLA.
L. REV. 189 (1982) (comparing the selective publication practice of the federal courts
and several states to Florida's use of the "per curiam, affirmed" decision and urging
adoption of a scheme mixing elements of the two practices); Keith H. Beyler,
Selective Publication Rules: An Empirical Study, 21 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 1 (1989)
(evaluating and explaining differences in several state court plans); Leah F. Chanin,
A Survey of the Writing and Publication of Opinions in Federal and State Appellate
Courts, 67 LAW LIBR. J. 362 (1974) (summarizing the response of state appellate
courts and federal circuit courts of appeal to the push for nonpublication); James N.
Gardner, Ninth Circuit's Unpublished Opinions: Denial of Equal Justice?, 61 A.B.A.
J. 1224 (1975) (evaluating the undesirable side effects of limited publication and
citation under the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's Rule 21
and recommending improvements); David M. Gunn, "Unpublished Opinions Shall
Not Be Cited as Authority": The Emerging Contours of Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 90(i), 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 115 (1992) (examining the scope of Texas state
courts' Rule 90, specifically the provision prohibiting citation of unpublished
opinions as authority); Mark D. Hinderks & Steve A. Leben, Restoring the Common
in the Law: A Proposal for the Elimination of Rules Prohibiting the Citation of
Unpublished Decisions in Kansas and the Tenth Circuit, 31 WASHBURN L.J. 155
(1992) (analyzing current restrictions on publication in Kansas state and federal
courts, and recommending a change that would allow citation of unpublished
decisions); Peter J. Honigsberg & James A. Dikel, Unfairness in Access to and
Citation of Unpublished Federal Court Decisions, 18 GoLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 277
(1988) (summarizing the history of and arguments supporting and opposing limited
publication and citation in the federal courts, discussing discrepancies in access to
unpublished opinions, and concluding that all decisions should be published,
whether designated by the court as precedential or nonprecedential); Taylor Mattis,
Precedential Value of Decisions of the Court of Appeals of the State of New Mexico,
22 N.M. L. REV. 535 (1992) (discussing the court structure and the workings of
stare decisis within New Mexico's courts of appeal); Gilbert S. Merritt, Judges on
Judging: The Decision Making Process in Federal Courts of Appeals, 51 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1385, 1392-94 (1990) (providing an overview of the limited publication system
and concluding that the argument that judicial accountability is lessened through
nonpublication is "overstated"); Jenny Mockenhaupt, Assessing the Nonpublication
Practice of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 787 (1993)
(analyzing limited publication and citation in Minnesota and proposing a stricter
rule against the citation of unpublished opinions); John E. Mueller, Unpublished
Opinion Study, ST. CT. J., Summer 1977, at 23 (summarizing a report explaining
and evaluating nonpublication in California's Courts of Appeal); David W.
Neubauer, Published Opinions Versus Summary Affirmations: Criminal Appeals in
Louisiana, 10 JUST. SYS. J. 173 (1985) (reporting which of the various types of
Louisiana criminal appeals are most and least likely to be decided by a written
opinion); David Newbern & Douglas L. Wilson, Rule 21: Unprecedent and the Disappearing Court, 32 ARK. L. REV. 37 (1978) (reporting the results of a survey of
lawyers participating in Arkansas cases not designated for publication about their
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general views on non-publication and the advisibility of not publishing opinions in
attorneys' specific cases, and suggesting that courts find a different response to
their problems than the negative mechanism of limited publication and citation);
Hon. Philip Nichols, Jr., Selectiue Publication of Opinions: One Judge's View, 35 AM.
U. L. REv. 909 (1986) (defending the Federal Circuit's plan of limited publication
and prohibition against citing unpublished opinions); Max N. Osborn, Publication of
Opinions by the Texas Board of Appeals, 47 TEX. B.J. 655 (1984) (reporting a
statistical analysis of the effect of Texas Supreme Court's Rule 452 on the publication of opinions by the state's courts of appeal); George C. ·Pratt, Summary Orders
in the Second Circuit Under Rule 0.23, 51 BROOK. L. REV. 479 (1985) (critiquing the
use of Second Circuit Court of Appeals Rule 0.23, which allows unpublished and
uncitable summary orders, and outlining arguments for and against continued
application of the rule); Edwin R. Render, On Unpublished Opinions, 73 KY. L.J.
145 (1984-85) (arguing that Kentucky should do away with its current rule
prohibiting the citation of unpublished courts of appeal decisions); Lauren K Robel,
The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and Gouernment
Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 MICH. L. REV. 940 (1989)
(analyzing the advantages that particular classes of litigants secure through courts'
usage of limited publication-citation rules); Robert A. Seligson & John S. Warnlof,
The Use of Unreported· Cases in California, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 37 (1972) (discussing
the limitations on publication imposed by California Rule of Court 976 and advocating limited use of Rule 976 decisions); Hon. Bruce M. Selya, Publish and Perish:
The Fate of the Federal Appeals Judge in the Information Age, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 405
(1994) (arguing from the perspective of a federal appellate judge in favor cif restrictions on publication and citation imposed by federal courts of appeal); Philip Shuchman & Alan Gelfand, The Use of Local Rule 21 in the Fifth Circuit: Can Judges
Select Cases of "No Precedential Value"?, 29 EMORY L.J. 195 (1980) (explaining the
limitS on publication mandated by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' Rule 21 and
concluding that under the rule, judges did select unimportant appeals for non publication); Milton J. Silverman, The Unwritten Law: The Unpublished Opinion in California, 51 CAL. ST. B.J. 33 (1976) (opposing the limits on publication and citation imposed
in California Rules of Court 976 and 977); George R. Smith, The Selectiue Publication
of Opinions: One Court's Experience, 32 ARK. L. REV. 26 (1978) (evaluating favorably
Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 21, which limits the publication of opinions and the
citation of unpublished opinions); Donald R. Songer, Criteria for Publication in the
U.S. Courts of Appeals: Formal Rules uersus Empirical Reality, 73 JUDICATURE 307
(1990) (explaining the rationales behind limited publication and citation rules and
noting that most empirical studies of the courts of appeals limit their scope to
published opinions and ignore the importance of unpublished decisions); Herbert L.
Stern, The Enigma of Unpublished Opinions, 64 A.B.A. J. 1245 (1978) (criticizing the
arguments supporting limits on publication and citation and concluding that it is
impossible to deny precedential value to the decision of a higher court); David L.
Walther, The Noncitation Rule and the Concept ofStare Decisis, 61 MARQ. L. REV. 581
(1978) (criticizing Wisconsin Rule of Appellate Practice 809.23, which governs publication and citation in Wisconsin); Wisconsin State Bar Comm'n on Admin. of Justice
and the Judiciary, Final Report on Unpublished Opinions, 57 WIS. B. BULL., Aug.
1984, at 40 [hereinafter ·Wisconsin Bar Report) (recommending continued use of
Wisconsin's limited publication and citation rules); Pamela Foa, Comment, A Snake
in the Path of the Law: The Seuenth Circuit's Non-Publication Rule, 39 U. PITT. L.
REV. 309 (1977) (rejecting the underlying assumptions of limited publication plans
and arguing against the suppression of unpublished opinions as mandated by the
Seventh Circuit Court ofAppeals' Rule 35); Robert H. Plaskov, Note, Written Opinions
in the Modern Legal System: Publish and Perish, 41 ALB. L. REV. 813 (1977) (evaluating New York's experiments with its system of publication).
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II. THE PRINCIPAL CRITICISMS AND A CRITIQUE OF EACH
Just as there are features common to most restrictions on
publication and citation, a consensus exists on the criticisms
of them. Set out below are the five principal criticisms, each
followed by a critique.

A. Judicial Accountability
1. The Criticism-First and foremost, critics argue that
restrictions on publication and citation deal a crushing blow
to judicial accountability and thus foster judicial irresponsibility. Courts, critics maintain, are more apt to issue arbitrary rulings "if their past [decisions] cannot be cited to
them to guide and restrict their future action." 4 Courts can
use unpublished opinions to address "troublesome cases
presenting issues the court does not wish to address in
public" or to decide a case contrary to existing precedent
without also changing the path and direction of the current
law. 41 One commentator links limited publication and citation
rules with the success of tyranny. 42 Tyranny flourishes when
the law is unwritten, because then the law is known to few
and is unreviewable by the masses. 43 Written law, on the
other hand, allows for a check of the government and gives
the citizens a method to review the government's application
of the law. 44 For these reasons, this commentator argues that
publication of opinions, not a limited publication system,
better maintains an ordered system of civil liberties. 45

°

40. William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, Limited Publication in the
Fourth and Sixth Circuits, 1979 DUKE L.J. 807, 809.
41.
William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited
Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI.
L. REV. 573, 581 (1981).
42. Silverman, supra note 39, at 33.
43. Id. at 33-34.
44. See id. at 34 ("[W]ritten law created the potential for self correction.").
According to Silverman, "the justification for non-publication must be measured
against the compelling relationship which written law has to the preservation of
essential freedoms." Id. Measured in this light, Silverman concludes that the nonpublication arguments must fail. Id. at 40.
45. See id.
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2. The Critique-Are the critics correct in arguing that an
appellate court is more likely to be irresponsible by ignoring
binding precedent, hiding controversial rulings, or acting arbitrarily because some of its opinions are not published and
cannot be cited to it? Theoretically these practices may be
achievable, but practically, several reasons make this assertion untenable. First is the desire of almost every judge to do
the right thing. 46 Second are the constraints imposed upon the
appellate court by the appellate process itself. In most instances, an appellate decision is a collegial one reached by
three judges, at least two of whom must agree on the result. If
one disagrees and writes a dissenting opinion, then both the
majority and dissenting opinions qualify for publication under
most adopted rules. 47 In addition, other members of the same
court usually keep abreast of the decisions of panels on which
they do not sit, so one panel is unlikely to do something irresponsible without other members of the court knowing about
it. Further, the decision ordinarily is subject to additional
review, either by the entire court through an en bane
procedure, or by a higher court, or both. One of the most effective ways for a litigant to obtain further review is to show that
the present decision is inconsistent with prior decisions. This
can be done best if the appellate court provides a written
statement of reasons 48 supporting its decision, and thus a
statement should be prepared in every case. The present
system, under which many cases are decided by order without
a written statement of reasons, 49 has a much greater potential
for judicial irresponsibility.
46.
Perhaps the best expression of the judge's desire to do the right thing came
from Judge Albert Tate, Jr. He commented that judges are motivated by three principal drives. "First and foremost, ... is [the) motivat[ion] to achieve the humanly
fair or socially useful result, subject to the limitations of judicial review and the
demands of consistency with legal doctrine .... " Hon. Albert Tate, Jr., Federal Appellate Advocacy in the 1980's, 5 AM. J. TRIAL Anvoc. 63, 65 (1981). Second is the
"concernO that the opinion is technically sound and fairly applies relevant ...
authority." Id. Third is the concern about how the rationale of the opinion will be
applied in the future. Id.
47. See supra text accompanying note 39.
48. The designation "statement of reasons" is used to indicate that a court need
not file a formal opinion in every case, but need only give a written rationale of its
decision. Whether the statement of reasons should be a formal opinion and be
published is a separate issue. See supra text accompanying note 13.
49.
From June 30, 1992 to June 30, 1993, of the 25,567 decisions on the merits
filed by the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 3301 were by order without a reasoned explanation. Gwendolyn Coleman, Technical Information Specialist, Statistics Division,
Analysis and Reports Branch, Administrative Office of U.S. Courts (Nov. 30, 1993)
(unpublished data, on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
An additional 60 opinions were delivered orally, of which 55 were issued by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Id.
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Also supporting the proposition that restrictions on publication do not result in increased judicial irresponsibility are
empirical studies which examine the operation of the restrictions in appellate courts and the experience with trial courts.
Only two in-depth studies, one in California50 and the other in
Wisconsin, 51 have attempted to determine empirically whether
appellate courts actually make controversial or potentially
unpopular decisions and then hide them by either not writing
an opinion or by writing an opinion but designating it as not
for publication, hiding behind limited publication and citation
rules. 52 Both studies came to the same conclusion: the courts
used the rules in good faith and seldom used them to render
improper decisions. 53
Even more significantly, the federal and state trial court
systems both operate without a mandatory opinion writing
and publication requirement. Judges rarely write opinions in
cases disposed of at trial, and only a small fraction of those
opinions are published, and then only at the initiative of the
trial judge. 54 Nobody has suggested, however, that the lack of
published trial court opinions encourages irresponsible behavior by trial judges.
Not quite as relevant, but nonetheless significant, is the
English experience. While only a very small percentage of the
opinions of the English Court of Appeal-England's intermediate appellate court-are published because most are
delivered orally from the bench, and only published opinions

Mueller, supra note 39.
Wisconsin Bar Report, supra note 39.
52.
The other studies cited in supra note 39 almost always focus on a particular
area of substantive law and attempt to show inconsistency between some published
and unpublished opinions. Cf, e.g., Robel, supra note 39 (examining a survey of
government lawyers). These studies, however, prove only that in the eyes of some
scholars the decisions ofa court are not perfectly consistent. Law reviews, for example,
consist almost entirely of articles routinely drawing the same type of conclusion from
an analysis of only published opinions. Thus, there is no basis for suggesting that
limited publication and citation rules are the cause of the supposed inconsistency.
53.
See Mueller, supra note 39, at 23 ("There was no basis to conclude that large
numbers of significant decisions are being 'buried' in unpublished opinions."); Wisconsin Bar Report, supra note 39, at 41 (finding that "the Court of Appeals Publication
Committee has been faithful to the non-publication guidelines" and that "the criteria
applied by the Court of Appeals was effective in keeping out cases which shouldn't
be published").
54.
J. MYRON JACOBSTEIN & Roy M. MERSKY, FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL
RESEARCH 22, 45 (5th ed. 1990).
50.

51.

FALL 1994)

Restrictions on Publication of Judicial Opinions 131

can be cited, 55 it has never been argued that their limited
publication rule has resulted in judicial irresponsibility. 56
If an appellate court writes a statement of reasons which
goes unpublished, the decision is not necessarily secret and
hidden from public attention. The losing party still may use
the written statement of reasons to appeal to a higher court
or to complain to the legislature, the news media, or interest
groups; the party; or more likely its attorney, even may write
· a law review article about it. If the case is of public interest,
the news media will publicize the decision. A case involving a
controversial crime or issue such as obscenity, abortion
rights, gay rights, sex or race discrimination, or an election
dispute will receive attention regardless of whether the
opinion is published. In any event, the limited publication
rules usually do call for the publication of an opinion in these
types of cases. 57
For those who wish to study a court's decisions in a particular area, whether concerning the substantive law,
procedure, the parties involved, or
any other basis, the
researcher may review and critique the court's own records,
the briefs submitted, the trial court record, and the court's
statement of reasons. Researchers regularly do this with the
United States Supreme Court's denial of certiorari petitions,
which rarely are accompanied by opinions except in dissent,
as well as with appellate court actions on which no opinion is
written, such as disposition of interlocutory appeals. 58
Neither the California nor the Wisconsin study suggested
that the lack of published opinions supporting these decisions
has led to judicial irresponsibility.

on

55.
RoBERT J. MARTINEAU, APPELLATE JUSTICE IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED
STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 104-07, 150 (1990) (describing the English reporting system and giving statistics on the percentages of opinions reported and unreported, and the number of appeals terminated on the merits). In 1986, only 39%
of the 884 opinions of the English Court of Appeal were reported. Id. at 107, 150.
56. But cf Burton M. Atkins, Selection, Reporting and the Communication of
Legal Rights in England, 76 JUDICATURE 58, 67 (1992) (noting·that "outcomes of
published and unpublished decisions [in England] differ substantially" and offering
sociological and statistical explanations for this finding, but falling short of criticizing the courts).
57. E.g., COMMITTEE ON APPELLATE COURT ENERGIES, supra note 5, at 16
(recommending publication of cases "involv[ing] a legal issue of continuing public
interest"); see also supra note 39 and accompanying text.
58. E.g., Michael Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal
Courts, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1165, 1199-1200 (1990) (studying the denial of interlocutory appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)).
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Perhaps the weakest part of the judicial accountability
criticism is that it demonstrates a lack of understanding
about the relationship between the real reasons for a judicial
decision and the reasons given in the opinion supporting that
decision. As I have explained in a recent article, 59 there is no
necessary relationship between the two. The written statement of reasons merely seeks to legitimize the court's
decision by making it appear consistent with prior opinions
and the facts as shown by the record. 60 If a court is intent
upon acting irresponsibly, it can do so with a published opinion just as well as without one. The leeways of precedent and
the fuzziness of the record almost always enable a court to
make any decision appear reasonable. 61 Consequently, the
protection against irresponsibility comes not from the published opinion, but from the other constraints upon the appellate process, particularly the parties' ability to examine
and dispute the required written statement of reasons.
Fear of judicial irresponsibility is a legitimate concern.
American appellate systems, however, have many built-in
protections to prevent against this irresponsibility without
mandatory publication of opinions. Accordi~gly, this fear of
irresponsibility does not justify mandatory publication.
B. Review by a Higher Court

1. The Criticism-Critics contend that review by a higher
level is hampered by limited access to all opinions. 62 They
argue that the law announced in published cases and the
results reached in unpublished decisions may differ. 63 The
potential for perceptions of judicial impropriety also increases, because litigants may conclude that the opinion was
not published because the court lacked sufficient reasons to
support a coherent rationale. 64 Further, judges can use

59.
Robert J. Martineau, Craft and Technique, Not Canons and Grand Theories:
A Neo-Realist View of Statutory Construction, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1993).
60.
Id. at 27.
61.
See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
62-91 (1960) for an explanation of how precedent can be avoided.
62.
E.g., Reynolds & Richman, supra note 40, at 809.
63. See, e.g., Render, supra note 39, at 158-60.
64.
Id. at 158.
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unpublished opinions to hide embarrassing information about
litigants, to send messages to government agencies on how
the agencies should act in the future without disapproving of
past actions, or to save lawyers from embarrassment by not
revealing that an attorney's improper or negligent conduct
was the basis for the decision-none of which furthers a
responsible judiciary. 65 Judges even can use unpublished
opinions to rely on the rationale of a past unpublished
opinion, without disclosing the source of its reasoning. 66 "If
'[s]unlight is said to be the best of disinfectants,' then limited
publication may permit sores to fester." 67
2. The Critique-The criticism that restrictions on
publication and citation interfere with review by a higher
court, like the criticism that they encourage judicial irresponsibility,68 ignores the constraints upon judges inherent in the
appellate process and misunderstands the appellate process
itself. If an intermediate appellate court does in fact decide a
case with an unpublished statement of reasohs contrary to
the published case law, the losing party is in a perfect position to seek review in a higher court by pointing out the
discrepancy. Even if the losing party cannot cite unpublished
decisions of cases not following the published case law, that
party's appeal is not weakened. It is the inconsistency of the
lower court's unpublished opinion with prior published
opinions that is important. As long as the litigant can cite
published cases that contradict the lower court's decision in
his case, the fact that there are also other cases in which the
court did not follow binding precedent is irrelevant to the
party's chances for obtaining appellate review.
In any event, the statements of reasons in those unpublished, inconsistent cases are unlikely to be of much help
because they will seldom, if ever, show a conscious disregard
of the published case law. At most, unpublished opinions will
show lack of awareness of the accepted published law, but
that unawareness is best attributed not to the deciding
courts' schemes but to the failure of counsel to bring it to the
courts' attention. If appellate judges really are intent upon

65. See Paul Marcotte, Unpublished But Influential: With Technology, Opinions
Not in the Law Books Can Be Misused, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1991, at 26.
66. Id.
67.
Reynolds & Richman, supra note 41, at 581 (quoting LOUIS BRANDEIS,
OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 92 (1914)) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
68. See supra Part II.A.
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deciding a case contrary to binding precedent, they are more
likely to do so by reading the precedent so narrowly or construing the facts in such a way as to make the precedent
inapplicable to the present case. If the assumption is that
judges are dishonest, it does not follow that they are foolish
enough not to cover their tracks.
C. Predicting Precedential Value

1. The Criticism-The third common criticism of restricted publication and citation rules attacks the very foundation on which the restrictions are based. Though standards
have been adopted to aid judges in determining whether to
publish, critics often question the ability of judges to decide
conclusively what is or is not of precedential value. In the
first place, the rules' attempt to limit the scope of the term
"precedent" at all is a doubtful endeavor. In the common law
system, all decisions are precedent, regardless ·of whether
they are published. 69 To deny that they are precedent is to
deny that they exist, an impossibility. 70 An unpublished, uncitable decision cannot fit with the definition of stare decisis
and the purpose of the common law, regardless of its compliance with a set of standardized guidelines to determine its
precedential value. 71 This is because "all decisions make law,
or at least contribute to the process, for each shows [prospective litigants] how courts actually resolve disputes. "72
Additionally, it is debatable whether judges actually can
predict precedential value, especially when that prediction is
made early in the decision making process. "An early decision
not to publish entails significant costs, ... for value inheres
in the actual writing of the opinion."73 An early decision not
to publish may affect not only the form in which the final
decision is rendered, but also the actual reasoning or result. 74

69.
See Foa, supra note 39, at 310-13.
70. See id. at 310 ("Laws which cannot function as reasons for actions ... are
not really laws at all, for they cannot affect the future decision-making of the
citizenry.").
71.
Id. at 310-13.
72.
Reynolds & Richman, supra note 41, at 579.
73.
Id. at 581.
74.
Id.
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If that occurs, the judicial process may suffer. 75 Furthermore,
what is determined to be nonprecedential now may be of
value to future litigants. Limited publication and citation
rules require judges to determine in advance the rule of law
that will emerge from a case, and then to determine the
effect of their decisions on the development of the law. 76
Because our common law system emphasizes the importance
of facts in each case, judges hardly can hope to predict the
facts of future disputes. They cannot know today what will be
crucial to litigants of tomorrow, even when they follow the
standards designed to aid them in this determination. There
is no such thing as the "mere application of a rule, for every
case constitutes a needed reaffirmation and/or extension, at
least temporarily, of the rule." 77
Some commentators even have argued that the rules'
precedential criteria are flawed. Numerous studies have demonstrated that opinions that were precedential have not been
published. 78
Moreover, the fact that ail opinion raises no new issue of
law does not necessarily diminish the decision's importance.
Rather, "the frequency with which issues arise is some
measure of their importance." 79 It is not always the new
question that requires attention, but sometimes the old one. 80
Change results in our system of law not only because a "new"
issue of law arises, but also because an old issue recurs repeatedly. A well established rule might need to be changed. 81
Limiting the precedent available in a certain area hurts those
litigants who wish to use that precedent to establish change.
The accumulation of decisions in an area allows litigants to

75. Id.
76.
Foa, supra note 39, at 312-13.
77. Id. at 312.
78. E.g., Foa, supra note 39 (evaluating the precedential value of opinions unpublished by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit); Render,
supra note 39, at 155-62 (discussing unpublished but otherwise precedential
decisions by the Kentucky Court of Appeals); Robel, supra note 39, at 950-52
(analyzing a series of unpublished yet useful opinions by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concerning the pleading requirements for RICO violations).
79.
Silverman, supra note 39, at 34.
80.
Id.
81. Id. at 34-35. Silverman cites Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) as an
example of a decision overruling a well-established rule. Silverman, supra note 39,
at 35. I would also include Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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assess the stability of a doctrine with greater confidence and
helps them "flesh out a precedent ... [to] make it more understandable."s2 "[T]he sweep of a group of cases makes it
easier to understand the principles involved."s3
2. The Critique-The criticism that restricted publication
and citation rules fly in the face of stare decisis and thus are
inconsistent with the fundamental principle of the common-law
system ignores the historical development and present operation ofthe system of reporting opinions in England, where our
common-law system and the principles of precedent and stare
decisis developed. The English opinion-reporting system has
never published and does not today publish every opinion of
English appellate courts, even though the total number of
opinions issued each year in the English Court of Appeal and
House of Lords is little more than 1000.s4 In fact, these
courts always have published only a very small percentage of
their opinions, limited to those for which a barrister prepares
a summary of the opinion. s5 This system was a necessary
product of the practice of English courts to render most
opinions orally rather than in writing. 86 It was not until 1951
that transcripts of the oral opinions were produced and
placed in England's Supreme Court library in the Royal
Courts of Justice.s7 Today this library is the only place in
which the actual opinions can be found, other than on computer databases.ss An official transcript will not be cited in
the courts, however, because it does not meet the two
requisites for citation: the transcript is not a summary
prepared by a barrister and it is not published somewhere,
whether in a report or a newspaper.s9 There is no official
report, 90 only reports published under the auspices of a committee comprised of the bar (barristers), the Law Society
(solicitors), and private publishers. 91 Moreover, the texts of
82.
William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non·Precedential Prece·
dent-Limited Publication and No·Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1190 (1978).
83. Id.
84.
See MARTINEAU, supra note 55, at 150. For a further description of the
English reporting system, see id. at 104-07.
85. Id. at 104-07.
86.
Id. at 106-07.
87.
Id. at 105-06.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90.
Id. at 104.
91.
Id. at 105.
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the opinions included in the computer databases cannot be
cited. The American rules limiting publication and citation
are, in fact, far closer to the English system than the policies
of unlimited publication and citation advocated by the critics
of the American rules.
The criticism based on the unpredictability of a case's precedential value also is misplaced, although for a different
reason. Essentially this criticism is premised on an extreme
version of legal realism holding that all precedent is fact
based and that because the facts of every case are different,
every case is a unique precedent and thus should be
published. This argument not only overstates legal realism, 92
but if carried to its logical conclusion would destroy the underlying principle of stare decisis, that similar cases should
be decided similarly. If all cases are different because their
facts are different, there can be no precedent. The doctrine of
stare decisis assumes that some opinions do make law that is
valid beyond the narrow facts of the individual case. Limited
publication and citation rules reflect this assumption and
seek to publish only those opinions that can fairly be said to
make law. There is no reason why in most cases the judges
faced with deciding a case cannot determine early whether
their decision will make law worthy of writing an opinion. As
to citation rules, to prove that an area of law requires
change, litigants need not necessarily cite recent published
opinions, but only trial and appellate court decisions which
the proponents of change assert reflect an outmoded legal
principle.

D. Equality of Access
1. The Criticism-Critics of restricted publication and
citation also raise the issue of unfairness. They argue that
although the citation restrictions were designed to prevent
certain litigants from gaining an advantage over those with
less access to unpublished opinions, that advantage still

92. For a more complete statement of legal realism, see KARL N. LLEWELLYN,
THE BRAMBLE BUSH (1960). See supra text accompanying notes 59-61 for a discussion of how judges can avoid precedent without having to withhold publication of an
errant decision.
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exists. 93 The restrictions reduce, "but do not eliminate[, the]
effective use of unpublished opinions."94 Experienced litigants
can use "arguments, exact language, and hypotheticals" of an
unpublished opinion without ever revealing to the bench or
the other side the source of this material. 95 If the question is
really fairness, critics argue, the proper solution is not to
prohibit citation, but to require litigants to acknowledge the
source of their reasoning and conclusions so that the other
side stands on an equal footing before the bench. 96
2. The Critique-The supposed benefits of having access
to unpublished opinions that may not be cited are marginal
at best. For the benefits to be substantial, the unpublished
arguments, language, or hypotheticals must be so appealing
that the court will be more likely to adopt the position of the
party advancing the borrowed argument than that of his
opponent. There is little merit in this contention. Far more
persuasive would be to cite the court itself as the source of
the argument, language, or hypothetical because a court is "
always most concerned with its own precedent. Without citation, the unpublished material has no more persuasive force
than if its proponent were its creator. Essentially the only
difference is between the court thinking that the court agrees
with the party rather than the court agreeing with its own
unattributed prior reasoning. In either event, the court will
arrive at the same result.
To the extent that some persons gain an advantage from
being able to afford access to unpublished opinions while
others cannot, unlimited citation is not the only alternative.
Others are to publish all opinions or to prevent access to
unpublished opinions. The former would, of course, eliminate
all of the advantages of limited publication. The latter is
discussed in the next section.

E. Judicial and Litigant Economy
1. The Criticism-Finally, advocates of unlimited publication and citation attack the concept of restricted publication
93.
94.
95.
96.

See Reynolds & Richman, supra note 82, at 1195.
Id.
Id. at 1196.
See id. at 1199.
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and citation at its base. They question whether or not the
restrictions actually bring about the judicial and litigant
economy predicted by their supporters. 97 Empirical assessments have examined the federal circuits' caseloads, publication standards, time lapses between oral argument and
opinion, and total productivity. Unfortunately, all of these
have been relatively inconclusive. The critics argue that these
data do not demonstrate conclusively that restricted publication rules increase judicial productivity. 98
Critics also contend that the reports of the staggering
number of opinions are exaggerated. Some argue that there is
no indication that the "present trend" of opinion proliferation
will continue. 99 Further, they argue that even if the current
boom should continue, technologies such as microfiche,
microfilm, computer databases, and CD-ROM storage could
alleviate space and storage dilemmas at a reasonable cost. 100
One critic argues that with the advent of LEXIS and
Westlaw, the justification for restricting publication loses
strength. 101 She contends that with the availability ·of the
computer data banks, there should be no reason for limited
publication. 102 She further predicts that the competition
between electronic database services soon will lead to on-line
access to all opinions, resulting in a system of universal
publication. 103
The critics also dispute the argument that nonpublication
saves time. Were cases published more frequently, judges
would have more available precedent to work with, and the
work required to decide cases would in fact decrease. "[M]erely

97. See supra Part I.
98.
See, e.g., Reynolds & Richman, supra note 41, at 593-626; see also supra
note 39 (listing articles assessing the effect of limited publication and citation rules
in different jurisdictions).
99. E.g., Silverman, supra note 39, at 38. But see supra note 3 and accompanying text for the contention that observers have lamented the proliferation of
opinions for the last 60 years.
100. Silverman, supra note 39, at 38.
101. SUSAN w. BRENNER, PRECEDENT INFLATION 267-69 (1992). In a different
piece, Brenner notes that the availability of cases on-line weakens the arguments
based on limited space availability and the cost of maintaining libraries. Susan W.
Brenner, Of Publication and Precedent: An Inquiry Into the Ethnomethodology of
Case Reporting in the American Legal System, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 461, 534-40
(1990). In addition, she argues that the searching and finding techniques available
in computer-aided research weaken the argument that finding the relevant cases
available in the mass of precedent will be next to impossible. Id.
102. BRENNER, supra note 101, at 264.
103. Id.
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cumulative opinions [should not] threaten the cohesiveness of
the common law." 104 Instead, "they should, if anything, make
research and discernment of principle easier, since there will
be more cases elaborating a principle, and some of those
cases will be more recent as well." 105
Proposals for change have not been lacking either in
number or in variety. Some commentators have argued for a
complete repeal of publication and citation restrictions. 106
Others have proposed compromise along a middle ground.
One proposal is to permit citation of unpublished opinions as
persuasive but not binding authority. 107 This would put unpublished opinions on at least an equal footing with other
nonprecedential matters currently citable to the court such as
sociological data, treatises, and law review articles. 108 A court
then could follow the unpublished opinion if the court found
the reasoning persuasive enough when applied to the facts of
the case at hand. 109 Under this scheme, the proper use of
unpublished opinions is not set out by a bright line rule, but
"depends on the wisdom and integrity of judges. "110 Other
commentators believe that a solution exists in partial
publication, which permits the publication and citation of a
portion of an opinion, leaving unpublished the portions that
do not satisfy the criteria for publication. 111 Partial publication would reduce the length of published opinions, yet
permit the publication of portions of more opinions, thus
increasing access and judicial accountability. 112 "A partial
publication rule would result in fewer published pages with

104. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 82, at 1191.
105. Id.
106. E.g., Richard L. Neumeier, Unpublished Opinions: Their Threat to the Appellate System, BRIEF, Spring 1988, at 22, 40 (arguing that cases or statutes that
prohibit the citation of unpublished cases are "unwise [and) probably unconstitutional"); see also Hinderks & Leben, supra note 39, at 219 (urging the adoption of
rules that permit citation of unpublished opinions if the citing litigant provides
copies of the decision to the court and opposing parties); Honigsberg & Dike!, supra
note 39, at 299 (concluding that a litigant should have the opportunity to convince
the court of the importance of a non-precedential decision to her case).
107. George M. Weaver, The Precedential Value of Unpublished Opinions, 39
MERCER L. REV. 477, 492 (1988).
108. See id. at 490-91.
109. See id. at 491.
110. Id. at 493.
111. E.g., Eva S. Goodwin, Partial Publication: A Proposal For Change in the
"Packaging" of California Court of Appeal Opinions To Provide More Useful Information to the Consumer, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 53, 66-74 (1979).
112. Id. at 67.
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more precedentially useful 'meat' on each page than the
present 'all or nothing' rule." 113 Most advocates of restricted
publication and citation, meanwhile, have stood firm or
proposed slight changes that they believe would make the
rules work more effectively. 114
2. The Critique-Those who argue that writing a short
memorandum for use solely by the parties involves just as
much time as writing a full opinion for publication simply do
not understand the appellate opinion writing process. The
only empirical study of how appellate judges spend their time
shows that they devote approximately one half of their time
to writing opinions, more than they spend on any other
duties. 115 Clearly, the ability of a court to cope with its

113. Id. at 72.
114. Most commentators advocating this position admit some adjustments may
be needed and propose small changes in the operation of existing plans. These
changes are minor, involving such features as: (1) whether the decision to publish
should be made by a panel, the writing judge, an independent committee, or the
entire bar within a jurisdiction, e.g., Robert P. Andreani, Independent Panels to
Choose Publishable Opinions: A Solution to the Problems of California's Selective
Publication System, 12 PAC. L.J. 727, 741-43 (1981) (suggesting that the publication
decision be made by an independent panel composed of both legal scholars and
practicing attorneys selected pursuant to standards set by the California Supreme
Court and subject to review by that court); Gardner, supra note 39, at 1227 (advocating that the decision to publish should be in the hands of any federal judge within
the circuit, or ideally, by any member of the bar); Joyce J. George, Query: Is There a
More Systematic Way to Manage Publication of Opinions, 71 JUDICATURE 305, 359
(1988) (suggesting that the publication decision remain the responsibility of the
writing judge); Mueller, supra note 39, at 23 (concluding that the number of
opinions that should be published but are not would be reduced if judges would
"actively participate in reaching a collegial decision respecting publication in every
appeal"); (2) whether attorneys citing unpublished opinions in jurisdictions where
citation is limited or prohibited should be sanctioned or be cited for ethics violations, see Gunn, supra note 39, at 141 (suggesting that both are feasible options to
enforce the "shall not be cited as authority" language of Texas's limited publication
plan); (3) whether the plan should include an option by which attorneys may
request that a previously unpublished opinion be published, see Pratt, supra note
39, at 498 (noting a proposal in which a committee of the bar would recommend
which summary orders of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
should be published as per curiam opinions); and (4) whether the jurisdiction should
make an express statement as to whether it favors or disfavors limited publication,
rather than leaving the message implicit in the adopted plan. See Mockenhaupt,
supra note 39, at 807 (proposing that Minnesota eliminate its current rule, which
allows citation to unpublished cases pending notice to opposing counsel 48 hours in
advance, and instead add to its limited publication rule a presumption in favor of
publication); Reynolds & Richman, supra note 41, at 626-30 (proposing a model rule
that includes a presumption in favor of publication and indicating that empirical
data shows that such a presumption does in fact raise publication rates). But see
Mueller, supra note 39, at 23 (rejecting a presumption for or against publication).
115. See COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM,
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caseload is determined in large part by how much time a
judge must devote to a particular opinion. If that opinion is
intended solely for the parties to the appeal and their attorneys, the judge can write in an almost shorthand fashion,
with little space or time devoted to a recital of the procedural
history or the facts. The statement of reasons can and should
be limited to addressing the one or two main issues raised by
the appellant and .why, with a citation to only one or two
cases, the appellant's argument is rejected. Only when the
trial judge ignored obvious controlling authority should a
reversal be by unpublished opinion. The judge need devote
little time writing the unpublished statement of reasons,
because they often can be written by a. law clerk or staff
attorney.
In contrast is the time and care that goes into a published
opinion that makes new law, criticizes or rejects existing law,
explains the court's decision in a highly controversial case, or
applies existing law to facts substantially different from prior
cases. us This opinion becomes the object of study by the bar,
judges, and scholars, who will dissect, analyze, and apply or
distinguish the language of an opinion with the care given to
few written works apart from the Bible and the works of
Shakespeare. Judicial opinions, like the Bible, become the
bases on which people arrange their lives and conduct their
affairs. AB time permits, these opinions should be written
with the greatest of care and precision in language. Therefore, a brief statement of reasons by the court is appropriate
only when the court is performing its limited "review-forcorrectness function. "117 The statement of reasons should
inform the parties that their contentions have been considered, and provide a rational basis for the court's conclusion. A full opinion, on the other hand, is appropriate
when the court performs its law development function. An
opinion developing law demands far greater care and time
than the review-for-correctness statement of reasons. us

STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 49-50
(1975) (summarizing a study conducted in 1971-1972 showing that Third Circuit
judges devoted 48.2% of their time "to the writing and clearing of opinions").
116. For a description of one judge's approach to writing a full opinion, see
FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL APPELLATE BENCH 155-70 (1980). See generally RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, OPINION
WRITING (1990) (presenting theory and practice of writing opinions).
117. ALDISERT, supra note 116, at 20-22.
118. Id.
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Because review-for-correctness statements of reasons generally go unpublished, since judges rarely find error, the
judges and their staffs can and do devote much less time to
them. The savings in judicial time are, consequently, real and
substantial. Were they not, appellate courts could not have
had the dramatic increases in cases disposed of on the merits
per judge that have occurred in the past thirty years.
The argument that the number of opinions is not increasing and that legal research would not be more difficult if all
opinions were published also has little validity. The number
of appeals decided on the merits by the federal courts of
appeal rose from 3552 in 1964,119 when the U.S. Judicial Conference first called for limited publication, to 23,597 in
1992, 120 almost a sixfold increase. Just between 1985 and
1992, the number of appeals terminated on the merits by
these courts increased from 16,369 to 23,597, an increase of
over fifty percent in just seven years. 121 The number increases each year, with no end in sight. In 1964, virtually all
opinions were published because there were no limited
publication rules. 122 In 1992, only 29.7% of the opinions were
published, but the total published was 6980, 123 still over twice
as many as in 1964. Notwithstanding the three-fourths
reduction in the percentage of opinions published by the
courts of appeals, the growth in the number of pages
published was so great that in October 1993, West Publishing
Company (West) issued the first volume of the Federal
Reporter, Third Series (F.3d) after completing 999 volumes of
the Federal Reporter, Second Series (F.2d). Each of the more
recent volumes of F.2d contains approximately 1500 pages,
compared to 1000 when F.2d was first published in 1925. It
took fifty years to issue the first 500 volumes of F.2d, but
only eighteen years, 1975 to 1993, for the last 499. The
number of opinions sent to West for publication each year by
both state and federal courts increased from 27 ,336 in 1964

119. 1964 REPORT, supra note 4, at 204 tbl. Bl.
120. Judicial Business of the United States Courts, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE U.S. COURTS, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DmECTOR 110 tbl. 83 [hereinafter
1992 ANNUAL REPORT).
· 121. DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1985
ANNUAL REPORT 261-65 tbl. B5; 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 120, at tbl. 83.
122. Cf text accompanying supra note 5.
123. 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 120, at tbl. 83.
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to 66,500 in 1992, 124 even with the large number of unpublished opinions and dispositions issued without opinion.
Significantly, the 1964 total of 27,336 opinions was approximately 200 less than in 1929, and only about 8000 more
than in 1895. 125
The effect of limited publication rules can be seen by comparing the number of opinions published by West in its
various reporters and the number included in its computerbased Westlaw system. In addition to the 66,500 opinions
received for publication, approximately 33,500 additional
opinions are included in Westlaw. 126 Essentially, 100,000
opinions are being added to the database each year. And
these do not include all of the opinions being written, because
some courts, including several federal courts of appeals, do
not send their opinions to Westlaw or LEXIS. 127 If every
opinion of every court were included, the total would probably exceed 150,000 per year. Those who argue that opinion
proliferation is not a problem are ignoring or are unaware of
the facts.
Another argument is that the inclusion of both published
and unpublished opinions in the commercial computer based
systems of LEXIS and Westlaw eliminates the rationale
behind the limited publication and citation rules. This argument identifies the right culprit, but the wrong problem and
the wrong solution. There is no doubt that computer based

124. Telephone Interview with Donna M. Bergsgaard, Manager, Reporter-Digest
Department, West Publishing Company (Nov. 24 & 30, 1993) (unpublished data, on
file with the Uniuersity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). _Data on years prior to
1989 can be found in ALDISERT, supra note 116, at 1-2.
125. See ALDISERT, supra note 116, at 1-2 (calculations computed by the author).
126. Bergsgaard Interview, supra note 124.
127. West Publishing Company, for example, receives unpublished opinions for
inclusion in Westlaw from eight United States courts of appeal (excluding the
Second, Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits) and only nine states. Id. The refusal of
the Fifth Circuit to send unpublished opinions to Westlaw and LEXIS was confirmed by an official of the Fifth Circuit. Telephone Interview with Dawn Eiserloh,
Opinion Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Nov. 24, 1993).
The refusal results from the Fifth Circuit's opinion distribution plan, which
provides that unpublished opinions are to be placed in the court's library and sent
only to the parties and to the court's printer, the latter only for inclusion in the
table of unpublished opinions printed periodically in the Federal Reporter.
Telephone Interview with Dawn Eiserloh, Opinion Clerk, United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Nov. 30, 1993). In the 1992 fiscal year, the Fifth
Circuit filed 2094 unpublished opinions. 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 120, at
tbl. S3 (total of all Fifth Circuit opinions accompanied by reasons given by the court
for its decision calculated by the author).
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systems have to a large degree destroyed the effectiveness of
rules restricting publication. Judges know their "unpublished" opinions will be read by a far larger audience than
merely the parties to the appeal. Thus, they may feel compelled to write for the larger audience, thereby negating one
of the principal benefits of unpublished opinions: reduced
writing time. 128 Even more importantly, those who engage in
legal research-judges, attorneys, and scholars-must now
search all opinions in the database, whether designated for
publication or not, to ensure that they have not missed
anything that might be useful. Research in the databases is
not, however, free or even cheap, whether considering the
cost of the researcher's time or the cost of access to the
databases.
Whether done in books or computer databases, legal
research takes time, and time is money. The more opinions
available to research, the more time the research takes, and
the greater the cost. The only solution to the computer database problem is not to abandon limited publication, but to
keep out of the databases statements of reasons not designated for publication.
III.

PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

As demonstrated in Part II, the problems with restricted
publication and citation do not justify eliminating or even
weakening the restrictions. That is not to say, however, that
the restrictions are not without problems. These problems
stem from three primary causes: (1) the lack of a fail-safe
system to ensure that all precedential opinions are published;
(2) the failure to enforce strictly the rules restricting citation;
and (3) the inclusion in computer databases of statements of
reasons designated "not for publication."
As to the first, there is no question that some opinions that
make law are still designated "not for publication." Whatever
the reason-and there is no basis for suspecting that the
decision is based on improper grounds-the rules should
provide means to correct the error. One means should be
preventive, avoiding the problem before it occurs. This can be

128. See text accompanying supra notes 35-36 and Part 11.E.
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done by establishing an internal review system within each
court. An advisory publication panel of judges, staff attorneys, or both, would review each statement of reasons
tentatively designated as "not for publication" to determine
whether the statement meets any of the criteria for publication. Were the publication panel to conclude that it does, the
authoring judge would be required to expand the statement
to make it suitable for publication, primarily by adding facts
sufficient to make the opinion understandable to those who
are not parties to the appeal.
Another means should be remedial, correcting the problem
after it occurs. The court's rules should provide that subsequent to issuance of the unpublished statement of reasons,
any person, including the parties, who becomes aware of the
statement, and who believes that the statement meets one of
the criteria for publication, could petition the court or
publication panel to order the statement published. If the
original deciding panel or the advisory publication panel
agreed, the statement could be published as an opinion, again
after the addition of a statement of facts necessary to make
the opinion understandable to outsiders. Because there is no
fixed time in which nonpariies will discover the statement of
reasons or determine its significance, the rules should allow
for an unlimited time to submit a petition for publication.
This double system of checks on the initial publication
decision should ensure the publication of virtually all opinions of precedential value.
The second and third problems, the lack of strict enforcement and the availability of unpublished opinions from computer databases, are related closely and the correction of one
should eliminate the other. The best way to make restricted
publication and citation rules work effectively is to enforce
strictly the rules against both attorneys and the courts,
primarily the latter. If a court relies on an unpublished
opinion, even once, that court not only invites, but almost
demands, that other judges on that court, lower courts, and
attorneys practicing in the court's jurisdiction research the
court's unpublished as well as its published opinions. 129 If

129. Perhaps the worst of all worlds was demonstrated by the recent case of
Hodges v. Delta Airlines, 4 F.3d 350 (5th Cir. 1993). In that case the court held that
it was bound by a previous unpublished opinion. Id. at 355 (citing Baugh v. Trans
World Airlines, No. 90-2074 (5th Cir. Sept. 14, 1990)). The opinion expressed
disagreement with the earlier decision, id., and called for en bane review of the
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lightning strikes once, the prudent judge or attorney must
assume that it can and will strike again. The inevitable
result is that the computer based research systems will include every opinion a court issues, unpublished and published. On the other hand, once the legal community learned
that citing unpublished opinions to the court brings no advantage, and perhaps even brings disadvantage, the need to
research them should cease and thus the research companies
would lose the economic incentive to include unpublished
opinions in their computer databases.
Although strict adherence to the no-citation rule would be
the principal means to eliminate the unofficial publication of
unpublished opinions, the courts could take additional steps
to discourage the unofficial publication of the statements of
reasons designated as "not for publication." One simple step
would be to refrain from sending the statements to persons
other than parties. Although a statement of reasons placed in
the pleading file of a case is no doubt a public document and
subject to being copied, 130 at the very least the court could
refuse to send copies to nonparties, including Westlaw and
LEXIS, and insist that anyone who wants a copy come to the
court clerk's office to copy it, the same as for any other document on file with the court. Many courts, including four
United States courts of appeals, 131 now follow this practice,
with the result that their unpublished opinions are not included in the computer databases. If every court followed the
same practice, the problem of published "unpublished"
opinions would be eliminated.
Another simple step, one perhaps even more useful, would
be for the court not to place the unpublished statement of
reasons in the case's pleading file or in its electronic
counterpart, but to incorporate it in the letter from the clerk
issues, id. at 356, but still adhered to the decision. Id. at 355-56. The result was
consistent, however, with Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5.3, which provides that unpublished opinions are precedent. Id. at 355.
130. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). The status of judicial
opinions is reviewed in Francine Biscardi, The Historical Deuelopment of the Law
Concerning Judicial Report Publication, 85 LAw LIBR. J. 531, 532-33 (1993) (showing that Wheaton created a private market for offering timely access to judicial
rulings) and in L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of
Copyright Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L. REV.
719, 813-14 (1989) (analyzing the effects of West Publishing Company's success in
maintaining its monopoly over pinpoint cites to its National Reporter system).
131. The circuits which do not allow their unpublished opinions to be placed online are the Second, Third, Fifth, and Eleventh. See supra note 127.
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to the parties notifying the parties of the court's decision in
the case. The letter would go on to state: "The Court has
directed me to advise you that its reasons for its decision
were ...." Because this letter would be placed in the correspondence file rather than the pleading file, it would not be
part of the formal record in the case. This letter would be
subject to inspection by others, but would not look like an
opinion or be easily incorporated into a computer database. 132

CONCLUSION

Appellate judges were the principal initiators of the restrictions on publication and citation of opinions, enabling them
to dispose of more cases more quickly while reducing the time
and expense involved in researching opinions. To a large
degree these rules have worked well, but recently they have
been subjected to a drumbeat of criticism 133 and are seriously
threatened by the inclusion of all unpublished opinions m
computer databases marketed to the legal community. 134

132. The most recent development in the field of opinion publication has been
the effort to abandon the traditional system of citation to the printed case reporters.
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has allowed, and
the Louisiana Supreme Court has required, litigants to cite cases using a "public
domain citation," which is limited to the case's name, case number, deciding court,
and date. Ernest E. Svenson, Alternative Citation Styles Gain Ground, A.B.A.
LITIG. NEWS, Aug. 1994, at 1, 6 (discussing arguments for public domain citation
which are being considered by a number of groups across the country). This type of
citation system is actually a non-citation system because it gives only the name and
number of the case and not where the opinion can be found by the researcher. This
necessarily would complicate research. The researcher first would have to find
where the case is published or the computer database in which it is located, and
then find or retrieve the text. A computer and a subscription to the service that
includes the text of the court's opinions would, of course, be necessary to obtain the
text electronically.
For some, case name and number citation is merely an inevitable step on the
road to the information highway, when all information and texts will be available
only electronically, and books and libraries will go the way of stone tablets and
manuscripts handwritten by monks. For others, the new system is a way of defeating West Publishing Company's near monopoly on the publication of judicial
opinions. Susan Hansen, Fending Off the Future, AM. LAW., Sept. 1994, at 74. To
the author, there is no evidence that the traditional publication citation system is
not still cheaper, quicker, and accessible to more researchers than the electronic
non-citation system now advocated by some. Until that evidence is conclusive, the
traditional system should be retained.
133. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
134. See supra text following note 127.
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This Article has attempted to demonstrate that most
criticisms of the limited publication and citation rules are
invalid. Rather, despite weaknesses in the courts' administration of the rules, the goals of the rules remain valid. Rather
than eliminate the rules, several changes should be made in
their administration. First, the rules should provide for an
internal review of a decision not to publish. Second, they
should permit anyone, party or nonparty, to petition the
court to publish an unpublished statement of reasons. Third,
courts should not put unpublished statements of reasons in
the form of an opinion, but should incorporate them into a
letter from the clerk to the parties. Fourth, and most importantly, each court should rigorously enforce its no-citation
rule against itself, courts subject to their jurisdiction, and
attorneys submitting briefs to either. A court's no-citation
rule should apply not only to its own unpublished opinions
but those of other courts. Enforcement could include the
refusal to consider an unpublished opinion, the striking of a
brief that includes the citation, or treating citation of an
unpublished opinion as professional misconduct.
If these proposals are adopted, the goals originally sought
to be gained by restrictions on publication can be achieved, to
the benefit of both the courts and those who must rely on
them to correct error and to develop the law.

